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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ohio law requires that juveniles accused of committing certain crimes 
are automatically removed from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and 
transferred to adult court if two requirements are satisfied: (1) they are 
sixteen or older at the time of the commission of the act charged and (2) 
1
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there is probable cause to believe that they committed the act charged.1 
On December 22, 2016, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided State v. 
Aalim, ruling that these mandatory transfer statutes are unconstitutional 
because they violate a juvenile’s right to due process as guaranteed by 
the Ohio Constitution.2 The state then asked the court to reconsider its 
ruling, and on May 25, 2017, the Supreme Court of Ohio, equipped with 
two new Justices, overturned its previous decision in Aalim I and ruled 
that the mandatory transfer does not violate due process.3 
In 1967, the Supreme Court of the United States transformed juvenile 
justice when it held that juveniles are constitutionally entitled to 
procedural safeguards under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.4 Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the 
juvenile justice system has focused primarily on the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, rather than 
a Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis.5 In this period of Eighth 
Amendment decisions, the Supreme Court routinely struck down certain 
punishments as applied to juveniles on the grounds that children are 
fundamentally different from adults.6 While the “kids are different” 
approach permeates Supreme Court decisions regarding the Eighth 
Amendment, the Court has never applied the theory to due process 
concerns.  
In 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States declared that 
juveniles cannot be transferred to adult court without a hearing where 
they are represented by counsel.7 Then, the Supreme Court of Ohio in 
Aalim I became the first high court in the nation to declare that the 
mandatory transfer of juveniles to adult court is a violation of due 
process.8 The Court noted that children are “constitutionally different 
from adults,”9 and drawing on its previous decisions,10 held that a due 
process requirement of “fundamental fairness” requires an amenability 
hearing to determine a juvenile’s suitability to be tried in juvenile or 
 
 1. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.10(A)(2)(b) (2017); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2152.12(A)(1)(b) 
(2017).  
 2. State v. Aalim, 2016-Ohio-8278 (hereinafter, “Aalim I”). 
 3. State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956 (hereinafter, “Aalim II”). 
 4. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967). 
 5. Casey McGowan, et al., Moving Forward from Gault, 41 Champion 22 (2017). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) 
 8. McGowan, supra note 5 at 25. 
 9. State v. Aalim, 2016-Ohio-8278, at ¶ 22. 
 10. In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶ 78. (There, the court 
held that fundamental fairness requires that the juvenile court judge decide the appropriateness of any 
adult penalty for juvenile acts.) 
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adult court.11 Of course, this analysis was subsequently overruled in 
Aalim II. This case was not appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States; however, the time is looming for the nation’s highest court to 
address whether the “kids are different” approach applies to the 
Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Eighth Amendment.  
Part II of this article examines the standards for due process review, 
provides an overview of Ohio and federal juvenile justice jurisprudence, 
and breaks down State v. Aalim. Part III analyzes the decisions reached 
by the Supreme Court of Ohio and argues that the court did not reach the 
correct outcome. Part IV concludes by calling for the Supreme Court of 
the United States to settle the question posed by Aalim.  
II. BACKGROUND 
This section examines due process and the jurisprudentially 
recognized notion that “kids are different” in order to provide the 
context for the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decisions in the Aalim cases.  
Due Process 
The concept of “due process” has its foundation in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which States that no State 
shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”12 Within the Ohio Constitution, there is a “due course 
of law clause” which provides: “All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice 
administered without denial or delay.”13 The Supreme Court of Ohio has 
interpreted the Due Course of Law Clause of the Ohio Constitution as 
coextensive with the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution because the language is “virtually the same.”14 The 
Supreme Court of Ohio, however, has also held that the Ohio 
Constitution is a document of independent force that may provide 
greater due process protections to juveniles than the United States 
Constitution.15  
The Supreme Court of the United States has observed that “‘due 
 
 11. State v. Aalim, 2016-Ohio-8278, at ¶ 20. 
 12. U.S. Const. amend. 14, § 1. 
 13. Ohio Const. art. 1, §16.  
 14. In re Hua, 62 Ohio St.2d 227, 230, 405 N.E.2d 255 (1980). 
 15. State v. Bode, 144 Ohio St.3d 155, 2015-Ohio-1519, 41 N.E.3d 1156, at ¶ 23-24 (finding a 
greater due-process right to counsel for a juvenile under the Ohio Constitution than under the United 
States Constitution). 
3
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process’ has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined.”16 
The application of due process differs depending on the importance 
attached to the interest at stake and the circumstances under which the 
deprivation of that interest could occur.17  
A Due Process analysis can be either procedural or substantive in 
nature.18 The Due Process Clause protects against more than unfair 
process; it also substantively protects against governmental infringement 
of liberty interests and fundamental rights.19 The Supreme Court of the 
United States has stated that applying the Due Process Clause can be “an 
uncertain enterprise which must discover what ‘fundamental fairness’ 
consists of in a particular situation” by evaluating relevant precedent and 
considering the several interests that are at stake.20  
The requirements of due process are “flexible and call for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”21 When 
performing a procedural due process analysis, the leading case, Mathews 
v. Eldridge,22 controls. Courts must consider three different factors: (1) 
the private interest to be affected by the government action; (2) the risk 
that the procedure will result in an erroneous deprivation of that interest, 
and the value of any additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the 
government’s interest in the procedure, including the burdens of 
additional safeguards.23 
The Supreme Court of the United States’ “established method of 
substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features.”24 First, the 
Court has “observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those 
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in 
this Nation's history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they 
were sacrificed.’”25 Second, the Court has “required in substantive-due-
process cases a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty 
interest.”26  
 
 16. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981). 
 17. Walters v. Natl. Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 (1985). 
 18. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). 
 19. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993). 
 20. Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18 at 24-25. 
 21. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 481 (1972). 
 22. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 23. Id. at 335 
 24. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
 25. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21, (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) 
(plurality opinion)); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937). 
 26. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (1997) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). 
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Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
Beginning in 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States Court has 
consistently held that constitutional protections apply equally to 
juveniles and adults in the justice system.27 In Kent v. United States, a 
case decided pursuant to the “Juvenile Court Act,” the Court held that 
before a juvenile court can transfer a defendant to adult court, there must 
be a hearing and a “full investigation”28 into the case. While the hearing 
need not conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial, it must 
“measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”29 Due 
process requires that at this hearing the juvenile be afforded assistance 
of counsel and a statement of reasons for the decision.30  
In 1967, in In re Gault, the Court built upon Kent and held that 
juveniles accused of crimes have many of the same due process 
protections as adults.31 This includes adequate written notice, a right to 
counsel, the right to implicate the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination, and the right to confront a witness.32 Then, in 1975, 
the Court held that the double jeopardy clause applies to juveniles as 
well as adults, so that a juvenile may not be retried as a juvenile or an 
adult.33  
“Kids are Different” 
 In 1989, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the execution 
of a juvenile who had been convicted of murder.34 In 2005, however, the 
Court reversed that ruling, finding that the execution of a juvenile is a 
violation on the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and 
unusual punishment.”35 The Court noted three important differences 
between adults and juveniles which demonstrate that the death penalty is 
not a suitable punishment for juveniles: (1) “a lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility”36 which result in “impetuous 
and ill-considered actions and decisions;”37 (2) “juveniles are more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative pressures, including peer 
 
 27. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 28. Id. at 559. 
 29. Id. at 542. 
 30. Id. 
 31. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 3, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1431 (1967). 
 32. Id. at 3. 
 33. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 520 (1975). 
 34. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 35. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005). 
 36. Id. at 569. 
 37. Id. 
5
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pressure;”38 and (3) “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as 
that of an adult,”39 and, thus, “the personality traits of juveniles are more 
transitory, less fixed.”40 The Court also drew on a national consensus 
against the juvenile death penalty, noting that thirty States prohibit the 
death penalty for juveniles.41 Especially relevant to the Court was that 
there was a trend, albeit slow, in the number of States that had abolished 
the death penalty for juveniles since their last ruling in Stanford.42  
In 2010, the Court used this “kids are different” rationale to rule that 
sentences of life without parole for non-homicidal crimes constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment.43 In 2011, the Court determined that 
there are different standards for juveniles and adults to determine when 
an individual is “in custody” with respect to Miranda rights.44  
Then, in 2012, the Court ruled that a statute imposing a mandatory 
life without parole sentence for murder is a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.45 Notably, the Court affirmed that “children are 
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing,” due to 
“their diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.”46 So, 
while the principle that “children are constitutionally different” is firmly 
established in the nation’s highest court, the concept has not been 
applied to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Juvenile Justice System in Ohio 
Juvenile courts were founded on the premise that the state has a role 
as parens patriae47 to a delinquent child, and that the goal of the 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 570. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 564. 
 42. Id. at 565 (although only five States had abolished the juvenile death penalty since 1989, the 
court noted that there was a “consistency of direction of change” showing a national consensus against 
the practice). 
 43. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (the Court noted that advances in psychology and 
brain science have shown that juveniles are fundamentally different from adults, that their brains are still 
maturing through adolescence, and that they are more capable of change than adults). 
 44. J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011). (The court noted that “children are often less 
mature and responsible than adults;”  that they “often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to 
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them;”  that “they  are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to outside pressures than adults;”  and that “children characteristically lack the capacity to 
exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around 
them.”) 
 45. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 461 (2012). 
 46. Id. at 471. 
 47. Refers to the policy that the government should intervene and act as the parent of a child who 
cannot care for itself. 
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juvenile justice system is to rehabilitate and protect the child.48 In Ohio, 
the statutorily-defined purpose of the juvenile justice system includes to 
“provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development 
of children” and “rehabilitate the offender.”49 The juvenile justice 
system has always emphasized individualized assessment, addressing 
the best interests of the child, and helping juveniles reintegrate into 
society. 50 
The first juvenile court in the United States was established in Cook 
County, Illinois, in 1899, and the first juvenile court in Ohio was 
established in Cuyahoga County in 1902.51 In 1937, the Ohio legislature 
established juvenile courts throughout the state, vesting “exclusive 
original jurisdiction” over any delinquent child.52 The amenability 
hearing before transfer to adult court was added to the juvenile justice 
system in 1969.53 
Mandatory Transfer Laws 
In 1996, in response to rising juvenile crime rates54 and a growing 
national fear of “superpredators,”55 the Ohio legislature enacted a law 
requiring the mandatory transfer of juveniles accused of committing 
certain offenses.56 This created “a narrow exception to the general rule 
that juvenile courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over any 
case involving a child.”57 The statute sets forth which juvenile cases are 
subject to mandatory transfer and provides that certain children are 
eligible for mandatory transfer to adult court if they are sixteen or older 
and commit a category one58 or category two offense,59 or the child was 
 
 48. State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, at ¶ 63-4 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting). 
 49. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2152.01 (LexisNexis 2017). 
 50. State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 88, 2000 Ohio 436, 728 N.E.2d 1059. 
 51. State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, at ¶ 17. 
 52. Id. at ¶ 63 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. at ¶ 17. 
 54. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, at ¶ 2; State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 2000-Ohio-436, 728 
N.E.2d 1059 (noting that the mandatory-transfer statute is part of Ohio’s response to rising juvenile 
crime). 
 55. Hillary Clinton, Campaign Speech Advocating for President Clinton’s Bill on Criminal 
Justice Reform (Jan. 28, 1996).  
 56. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, at ¶ 2. (The law was originally codified as Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
2151.26, now Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.12) 
 57. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.01 (2017). (The stated purpose of the statute is to “provide for 
the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children subject to this chapter, protect the 
public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender’s actions, restore the victim, 
and rehabilitate the offender”). 
 58. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.02(BB) (“Category one offenses” include murder, aggravated 
murder, attempted murder, or attempted aggravated murder). 
 59. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.02(CC) (“Category two offenses” include voluntary 
7
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fourteen or fifteen and had previously committed a category one or 
category two offense.60  
 In addition to the mandatory transfer statute, a separate statute calls 
for discretionary transfer, requiring the juvenile court to hold an 
amenability hearing before transferring a juvenile to adult court.61 The 
purpose of this hearing is to determine whether a juvenile is amenable to 
the juvenile justice system’s goal of rehabilitation.62 The Ohio 
legislature, however, deemed that an amenability hearing is not 
available for a juvenile who qualifies for mandatory transfer.63 In the 
case of mandatory transfer, a juvenile judge oversees a probable cause 
hearing where the judge must decide whether the juvenile meets the 
statutory age requirement, and that there is probable cause to believe 
that the juvenile committed the crime in question.64 If the judge finds 
that these criteria are satisfied, the juvenile is automatically transferred 
to adult court with no determination of whether the individual is 
amenable to rehabilitation.65 
Twenty-five other States and the federal government have mandatory 
transfer statutes similar to Ohio’s.66 Additionally, four States and the 
District of Columbia provide for a rebuttable presumption in favor of 
transfer.67 Twenty States have elected not to have mandatory transfer 
laws, proving only for the discretionary transfer of juveniles to adult 
court.68 The states that do not provide for mandatory transfer do so 
because their legislatures or citizenry have elected not to, not because a 
higher court has ruled those procedures to be unconstitutional.69 
Supreme Court of Ohio Jurisprudence 
 The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the Ohio Constitution is a 
“document of independent force,”70 and that while the state cannot 
provide less protection than the United States Constitution requires, they 
 
manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, involuntary 
manslaughter where the underlying predicate offense is a felony, and felonious sexual penetration). 
 60. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.10. 
 61. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.12. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. State v. Aalim, 2016-Ohio-8278, at ¶ 3. 
 65. Id. 
 66. State’s Reply Brief, March 1, 2016, 8. (Since the Brief has been filed, the state of California 
has eliminated mandatory transfer laws through Proposition 57). See Casey McGowan, et al., Moving 
Forward from Gault, 41 Champion 22, 25 (2017). 
 67. State’s Reply Brief at 8. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 6. 
 70. Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993). 
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are free to establish greater protections to individuals and groups.71 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled that the Ohio 
Constitution affords greater protection against double-jeopardy for 
juveniles than the United States Constitution.72 
The Supreme Court of Ohio, separately from the Supreme Court of 
the United States, has recognized that juvenile delinquency proceedings 
require the same procedural safeguards as adult criminal proceedings.73 
This includes the right to counsel;74 the right against self-
incrimination;75 and the right to double-jeopardy protections.76 The 
standard for due process challenges in juvenile proceedings recognized 
by the state of Ohio is “fundamental fairness.”77 The Supreme Court of 
Ohio has said that the meaning of “fundamental fairness” is as “opaque 
as its importance is lofty.”78 Thus, a “court’s task is to ascertain what 
process is due while being true to the core concept of due process in a 
juvenile case - to ensure orderliness and fairness.”79 
Case Background 
Matthew Aalim, who was sixteen and had no criminal record, was 
charged with what would be considered aggravated robbery if 
committed by an adult.80 The State filed a motion to transfer Aalim to 
adult court pursuant to the mandatory transfer laws.81 At the required 
hearing, the juvenile court found that Aalim was sixteen at the time of 
the alleged crime, and that there was probable cause to believe that 
Aalim committed the crime.82 Thus, the juvenile court automatically 
relinquished jurisdiction and Aalim was transferred to adult court.83  
Aalim argued that the mandatory transfer provisions violated due 
process and equal protection, as well as the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and 
 
 71. Id.  
 72. In re A.G., 148 Ohio St. 3d 118, 2016-Ohio-3306, 69 N.E.3d 646, at ¶ 11-13. 
 73. State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, at ¶ 26. 
 74. In re Agler, 249 N.E.2d 808, 810 (1969). 
 75. In re D.S., 111 Ohio St.3d 361, 2006-Ohio-5851, 856 N.E.2d 921, at ¶ 1. 
 76. In re A.G., 69 N.E.3d 646, at ¶ 11-12. 
 77. State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, at ¶ 94 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting) (quoting C.S., 115 
Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 80). 
 78. Lassiter v. Durham Cty. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981). 
 79. In re C.S., 2007-Ohio-4919, 115 Ohio St. 3d 267, 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 81. 
 80. State v. Aalim, 2016-Ohio-8278, at ¶ 2. (Aalim was actually charged with two counts of 
aggravated robbery with a firearm, because there were two victims.) 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 83. Id.  
9
Knowlden: State of Ohio v. Aalim: Due Process and Mandatory Transfer of Juv
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
260 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
the Ohio Constitution.84 The court disagreed, and Aalim entered a no-
contest plea and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of four years 
for each count of aggravated robbery.85 The Court of Appeals also 
rejected Aalim’s constitutional challenges, upholding mandatory 
transfer to adult court.86 Aalim appealed the case to the Supreme Court 
of Ohio, claiming that the mandatory transfer provisions violate due 
process and equal protection.87 
Aalim I 
On December 22, 2016, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued its ruling 
in Aalim I, holding in a 4-3 vote that the mandatory transfer of juveniles 
to the general division of the common pleas court is a violation of due 
process under the Ohio Constitution.88 The court ruled that, before a 
juvenile can be transferred to adult court, a juvenile judge must hold an 
individualized amenability hearing to determine whether the juvenile 
can meet the juvenile justice system goals of rehabilitation and 
reintegration.89 The court’s ruling did not rely on substantive or 
procedural due process, but instead used the “fundamental fairness” 
standard for due process claims in Ohio juvenile proceedings.90 
Matthew Aalim presented facial due process and equal protection 
challenges to the mandatory transfer provisions, arguing, inter alia, that 
“fundamental fairness requires that every juvenile demonstrate a 
capacity to change.”91 The court agreed with Aalim’s position that 
juveniles have a “special status,”92 and as such are “entitled to be treated 
as a juvenile” and “should receive an amenability hearing before any 
transfer” to adult court.93 The court stated that the amenability hearing is 
necessary because “fundamental fairness requires that juveniles have the 
opportunity to demonstrate a capacity to change.”94 
The court, citing Ohio and Supreme Court of the United States 
precedent acknowledging the differences between children and adults 
 
 84. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at ¶ 5. 
 87. Id. at ¶ 6. (In the Supreme Court of Ohio, Aalim did not argue that mandatory transfer is a 
violation of cruel and unusual punishment). 
 88. Id. at ¶ 31. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at ¶ 25. 
 91. Id. at ¶ 9. 
 92. Id. at ¶ 26. 
 93. Id. at ¶ 20. 
 94. Id. 
10
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for Eighth Amendment purposes,95 explicitly held that it “is a logical 
step for us to hold that all children, regardless of age, must have 
individual consideration at amenability hearings before being transferred 
from the protections of juvenile court to adult court upon a finding of 
probable cause for certain offenses.”96 The court reasoned that juvenile 
procedures must account for the differences between adults and 
children, and that mandatory transfer to adult court is a violation of 
fundamental fairness, which requires additional procedural safeguards 
for juveniles.97  
The court also held that Ohio’s discretionary transfer provisions were 
not a violation of due process because the procedures satisfy 
fundamental fairness.98 The procedures required before a discretionary 
transfer include an “investigation into the child's social history, 
education, family situation, and any other factor bearing on whether the 
child is amenable to juvenile rehabilitation, including a mental 
examination of the child."99 The court ruled that discretionary transfer 
provisions guarantee that children are recognized as “constitutionally 
different from adults,” and that in the process, discretionary transfer 
ensures that juveniles who are not amenable to rehabilitation are 
transferred to adult court.100 Thus, the court struck down Ohio’s 
mandatory transfer laws as a violation of due process under the Ohio 
Constitution, and upheld the constitutionality of discretionary 
transfer.101 
Three Justices dissented, accusing the majority of over-generalizing 
the extra protections that the Ohio Constitution guarantees, and 
changing the law without adequate analysis of what due process 
requires.102 Justice French accused the majority of striking down 
mandatory transfer without any compelling reason to do so besides 
“mere permissibility.”103 Additionally, Justice Kennedy argued that the 
court did not meet the required standard for finding a statute 
unconstitutional: proof beyond a reasonable doubt.104 
 
 95. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-571 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77-78 
(2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993); State v. 
Long, 138 Ohio St. 3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890; State v. Bode, 144 Ohio St.3d 155, 2015-
Ohio-1519, 41 N.E.3d 1156; In re A.G., 148 Ohio St. 3d 118, 2016-Ohio-3306, 69 N.E.3d 646;  In re 
C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729. 
 96. State v. Aalim, 2016-Ohio-8278, at ¶ 24. 
 97. Id. at ¶ 25. 
 98. Id. at ¶ 28. 
 99. Id. at ¶ 27. 
 100. Id. at ¶ 28. 
 101. Id. at ¶ 31. 
 102. Id. at ¶ 35 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 103. Id. at ¶ 47 (French, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at ¶ 36 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). (To succeed on a facial challenge, there must be no set 
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Justice Kennedy also reasoned that “fundamental fairness” is not an 
appropriate standard to be applied to mandatory transfer provisions 
because the principle is less concrete than the standards in the court’s 
previous decisions regarding juveniles in the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendment contexts.105 Justice Kennedy, however, argued that the 
“fundamental fairness” is satisfied by the statutorily required probable 
cause hearing.106 In Ohio, “fundamental fairness” requires that juvenile 
proceedings require such “basic constitutional protections as notice of 
the charges and the rights to counsel, confrontation, and cross-
examination.”107 According to Justice Kennedy, this standard is satisfied 
in the mandatory transfer statute, and furthermore, the decision to 
provide a juvenile with an amenability hearing is the province of the 
General Assembly.108 Thus, Justice Kennedy accused the majority of 
overstepping its bounds to overrule a process that the legislature has the 
exclusive authority to create.109 
Justice French, joined in dissent by Justice O’Donnell, also examined 
the due process ramifications in greater detail than the majority’s 
“fundamental fairness” review, performing both procedural and 
substantive due process analyses, and finding that the mandatory 
transfer provisions offend neither.110 First, Justice French wrote that 
substantive due process is not violated because the right to a juvenile 
court hearing or an amenability hearing is not a fundamental right 
“deeply rooted in the nation’s history” because the juvenile court system 
was not created until 1899, and was not adopted in Ohio until 1937.111 
Justice French noted that Aalim did not explicitly argue that mandatory 
transfer violates procedural due process.112 However, Justice French still 
wrote that procedural due process was not violated because the 
mandatory transfer provisions do not deprive a juvenile of a life, liberty, 
or property interest.113 Further, even if mandatory transfer deprived a 
juvenile of liberty by interest in retaining juvenile status, Justice French 
argued that the statutory provisions of a “probable cause hearing” 
provides enough due process before the transfer is completed.114  
 
of circumstances under which the law would be valid; it must be unconstitutional in all applications.  
Justice Kennedy said that the “majority's analysis does not meet this high standard”). 
 105. Id. at ¶ 40. 
 106. Id. at ¶ 41. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at ¶ 51 (French, J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. at ¶ 54. 
 112. Id. at ¶ 62. 
 113. Id. at ¶ 57. 
 114. Id. at ¶ 62. 
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Aalim II 
At the end of December 2016, Justices Lanzinger and Pfeifer, both in 
the majority in Aalim I, retired.115 Their seats on the bench were 
replaced by Justice DeWine and Justice Fischer.116 On January 3, 2017, 
the State filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision.117 The 
Supreme Court of Ohio can grant motions for reconsideration to “correct 
decisions which, upon reflection, are deemed to have been made in 
error.”118 On May 25, 2017, the court granted reconsideration and 
reversed the decision in Aalim I.119  
In its motion for reconsideration, the State argued that the majority in 
Aalim I failed to consider the provision of the Ohio Constitution that 
gives the General Assembly the exclusive authority to determine the 
jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas.120 The court agreed and 
granted the motion on the basis that the ruling in Aalim I undermined the 
legislature’s exclusive authority to define the jurisdiction of the 
courts.121  
The new five-member majority held that mandatory transfer does not 
violate due process under the Ohio Constitution or the United States 
Constitution.122 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy dismissed 
Aalim’s argument on substantive due process grounds “in short 
order,”123 holding that “[b]ecause Ohio’s Due Course of Law Clause and 
the federal Due Process Clause both predate the creation of juvenile 
courts in Ohio and throughout the United States, these provisions cannot 
have created a substantive right to a specific juvenile-court 
proceeding.”124 The court wrote that an amenability hearing is not 
“deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.”125 Further, the court refused to define an 
 
 115. Randy Ludlow, Paul E. Pfeifer, Retiring Ohio Supreme Court Justice has left mark, 
Columbus Dispatch (December 26, 2016, 12:01 A.M.), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2016/12/26/paul-e-pfeifer-retiring-justice-has-left-
mark.html. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Marianna Brown Bettman, Commentary: On Reconsideration: What’s Up With State v. 
Aalim?, Legally Speaking Ohio (April 4, 2017), 
http://www.legallyspeakingohio.com/2017/04/commentary-on-reconsideration-whats-up-with-state-v-
aalim/. 
 118. State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council, 662 N.E.2d 339, 341(1995). 
 119. State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, at ¶ 4. 
 120. Id. at ¶ 1. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 123. Id. at ¶ 17. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. 
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amenability hearing as a fundamental right based on its analysis of 
Supreme Court of the United States rulings.126 The majority found that 
the Supreme Court of the United States has been reluctant to expand 
substantive due process and create new fundamental rights.127 
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio refused to find a fundamental 
right in an amenability hearing.128 
The majority also found that mandatory transfer satisfies the 
“fundamental fairness” requirements of a hearing with effective 
assistance of counsel and a statement of reasons for the transfer.129 The 
court also distinguished the ruling in Kent requiring a “full 
investigation” before transfer to adult court, because that ruling was 
limited strictly to the Juvenile Court Act, and therefore did not apply to 
Ohio’s mandatory transfer laws.130 The court stated that fundamental 
fairness was satisfied because, before Aalim was transferred to adult 
court, a juvenile judge conducted a hearing wherein it was found that 
Aalim was sixteen, and that there was probable cause to believe that 
Aalim committed the crime.131 
Newcomer Justice DeWine wrote a separate concurrence, 
emphasizing why reconsideration was correct, and setting forth the 
proper analysis for substantive and procedural due process.132 Justice 
DeWine wrote that “procedural due process assesses the adequacy of 
procedures employed,” and “substantive due process reviews legislative 
enactments.”133 Justice DeWine concluded that because the mandatory 
transfer provisions are a legislative enactment of general applicability, 
the only possible claim that could be made is one of substantive due 
process.134 Justice DeWine wrote that the court improperly transformed 
the “fundamental fairness” standard from procedural into substantive, 
and therefore it should not apply to this case.135 Justice DeWine also 
criticized the theory of substantive due process, as “perhaps the most . . . 
controversial part of our federal constitutional tradition.”136 Due to this, 
Justice DeWine expressed a reluctance to expand the concept to include 
a fundamental right to an amenability hearing.137 While understanding 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at ¶ 17, 18. 
 128. Id. at ¶ 17. 
 129. Id. at ¶ 25. 
 130. Id. at ¶ 26. 
 131. Id. at ¶ 27. 
 132. Id. at ¶ 39 - 40 (DeWine, J., concurring). 
 133. Id. at ¶ 41. 
 134. Id. at ¶ 42. 
 135. Id. at ¶ 42-43. 
 136. Id. at ¶ 47. 
 137. Id. at ¶ 48. 
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that it may be a good idea to end mandatory transfer, Justice DeWine 
believes that choice belongs exclusively to the state legislature.138 
Chief Justice O’Connor authored the dissent, providing a passionate 
defense of the ruling in Aalim I.139 Chief Justice O’Connor reiterated the 
objectives of the juvenile justice system,140 emphasized Supreme Court 
of the United States rulings providing heightened protections for 
juveniles,141 and outlined the Court’s responsibility to strike down 
legislation that infringes on constitutional rights.142 Chief Justice 
O’Connor wrote that the Supreme Court of Ohio has the duty to be a 
constitutional check on the General Assembly to ensure that juveniles 
due process rights are protected.143 
 The dissent’s legal analysis begins by addressing why the issue of 
mandatory transfer is so important for a juvenile by quoting the State’s 
counsel at oral argument: “But the crux of the issue is punishment. 
That’s what this is all about. It’s not really about process, it’s not about 
procedure. It’s about what do we do to punish these juveniles who are 
transferred over to adult court.”144 Based on this reasoning, the Chief 
Justice concludes that Supreme Court of the United States rulings in 
J.D.B., Miller, and Roper, limiting juvenile punishments, are instructive 
to the issue of an amenability hearing.145  
Chief Justice O’Connor’s dissent does not address mandatory transfer 
in terms of substantive due process, instead focusing on procedural due 
process and “fundamental fairness.”146 The Chief Justice cites precedent 
recognizing that States can create liberty interests that are protected by 
the due process clause,147 and argues that juveniles have a substantial 
liberty interest in retaining their status as a juvenile.148 Therefore, before 
depriving a juvenile of that liberty interest, the court must abide by the 
balancing test set forth in Mathews, requiring a consideration of the 
liberty interest and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest, 
combined with the value of additional safeguards and any interest the 
government has in the matter.149 To the dissent, juveniles have a 
substantial liberty interest in maintaining their juvenile status because a 
 
 138. Id. at ¶ 50 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting). 
 139. Id. at State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, ¶ 52. 
 140. Id. at ¶ 64 (quoting In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, (1990)). 
 141. Id. at ¶ 65. 
 142. Id. at ¶ 66. 
 143. Id. at ¶ 66, 67. 
 144. Id. at ¶ 74. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at ¶ 75. 
 147. Id. at ¶ 78. 
 148. Id. at ¶ 79. 
 149. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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conviction in adult court is more severe and carries more serious 
consequences than a conviction in juvenile court, including public 
awareness of their crimes.150 Chief Justice O’Connor also wrote that the 
erroneous deprivation of a juvenile’s liberty interest is substantial 
because, under the current mandatory transfer procedures, the juvenile 
judge is not allowed to consider whether an offender is amenable to the 
goals of the juvenile justice system, and “there is significant risk of 
turning a delinquent capable of rehabilitation into a 
lifelong criminal.”151 Finally, the dissent argues that there is minimal 
impact on the governments interest and burden of requiring an 
amenability hearing because the difference in resources between an 
amenability hearing and the required probable cause hearing are 
negligible.152 So, this minimal burden does not outweigh the juvenile’s 
interest in retaining juvenile status.153 
Chief Justice O’Connor also provided a separate “fundamental 
fairness” dissent, arguing that mandatory transfer does not comport with 
the “full investigation” standard of Kent.154 Further, the Chief Justice 
criticized the majority’s reasoning that Kent only requires a hearing 
where the juvenile is represented by counsel and a statement of reasons 
for the transfer.155 Chief Justice O’Connor argues that the Kent court 
considered factors such as a juvenile’s criminal history and 
“sophistication and maturity.”156 Based on the facts of Kent, O’Connor 
argues that Ohio’s mandatory transfer laws do not provide the required 
process or “ceremony,” and therefore do not comply with fundamental 
fairness.157 In Chief Justice O’Connor’s words: “a hearing in which 
there is no consideration of a juvenile’s amenability to rehabilitation and 
treatment in the juvenile-justice system is not a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard.”158 The Chief Justice concluded the dissent with a plea for 
the Supreme Court of the United States, which has been silent on the 
issue of juvenile transfer to adult court since 1966, to address due 
process in the juvenile justice context.159 
Justice O’Neill wrote a separate dissent, beginning by voicing 
disagreement to reconsider the case, as there is “nothing new to 
reconsider here; the only thing that has changed is the makeup of this 
 
 150. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, at ¶ 83 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting). 
 151. Id. at ¶ 89. 
 152. Id. at ¶ 90-91. 
 153. Id. at ¶ 93. 
 154. Id. at ¶ 95. 
 155. Id. at ¶ 98. 
 156. Id. at ¶ 99. 
 157. Id. at ¶ 104. 
 158. Id. at ¶ 108. 
 159. Id. at ¶ 106. 
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court.”160 Justice O’Neill also wrote that Aalim I was decided based on 
procedural due process and substantive due process.161 O’Neill argued 
that society has developed a new fundamental right: to treat children as 
childlike,162 and that the court has the authority to protect that right as a 
recognition of a societal conscience.163 
III. DISCUSSION 
This section will analyze the rulings in the Aalim cases and provide a 
glimpse of the future of mandatory transfer laws. This article will not 
address the appropriateness of the Supreme Court of Ohio’s granting of 
the motion for reconsideration. The paramount, yet still unresolved issue 
in the Aalim cases, is the definition and applicability of fundamental 
fairness in juvenile proceedings; neither the holding in Aalim I or Aalim 
II provided any clarity on the subject. 
The Justices in the Aalim cases incorrectly defined and applied 
substantive due process and procedural due process. 
A constitutional due process analysis is not a matter easily 
undertaken. When “fundamental fairness” precedent is added to the 
equation, the task muddies the waters even more. While there may, in 
theory, be a “clear demarcation”164 between the concepts of substantive 
and procedural due process, the Justices’ almost laughable inability to 
agree on the due process inquiry, let alone the constitutionality of the 
matter, suggests otherwise.  
To recap, Aalim I was decided on the standard of fundamental 
fairness. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Aalim I blends fundamental 
fairness with procedural due process, and the dissent stems from 
substantive and procedural due process analyses. Aalim II was decided 
on substantive due process and fundamental fairness. Justice DeWine 
wrote a separate concurrence, joined by the author of the majority 
opinion, in order to define substantive and procedural due process, and 
differentiate between procedural fundamental fairness and substantive 
fundamental fairness. Justice DeWine believed that Aalim I was decided 
based on a “substantive due process standard of fundamental 
fairness.”165 Justice O’Connor based the dissent on separate analyses of 
 
 160. State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956 at ¶ 110 (O’Neill, J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. at ¶ 115. 
 162. Id. at ¶ 116. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956 at ¶ 41 (DeWine, J., concurring). 
 165. Id. at ¶ 47. 
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procedural due process and fundamental fairness and mentioned in a 
footnote that Aalim I was decided on procedural due process, a term that 
was never once used in that majority decision. Suffice it to say, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio has not provided us with a model of clarity. 
The court does not provide any lucidity on the similarities and 
differences between procedural and substantive due process and, due to 
this lack of precision, the Justices cannot even agree on the proper 
nature of analysis. Each analysis is appropriate in a separate context; 
however, the two concepts can overlap. Essentially, substantive and 
procedural due process can be distinguished based on the remedy 
sought. Substantive due process is invoked when a plaintiff is 
challenging a government action as violating a constitutional right. 
Procedural due process is invoked when a government action is being 
challenged as having a lack of adequate safeguards before depriving an 
individual of a protected interest. The inquiry, however, is not as simple 
as it seems. Not every deprivation of a protected interest gives rise to a 
procedural due process claim.  
A person may not bring a procedural due process claim when seeking 
benefits. However, a procedural due process claim is available when a 
benefit is terminated without adequate safeguards, because an individual 
has an interest in the continued receipt of benefits. For example, if the 
government would pass a law prohibiting abortion, a challenge to the 
law would not be based on the procedures of the government, but on the 
substantive constitutionality of the law. But, if the government were to 
cut welfare benefits for all recipients, procedural due process requires 
that there be a fair process for this determination. Also, once an interest 
is statutorily conferred, a legislature may not deprive an individual of 
that interest without appropriate procedure. Procedural protections are 
required when there is a deprivation of a constitutionally protected 
interest, and an issue about how the law applies to a specific individual. 
There is no disagreement among any Justices in the Aalim cases that a 
juvenile has a protected interest in retaining juvenile status for criminal 
proceedings. 
In Aalim II, Justice DeWine’s concurrence suggests that Aalim could 
not possibly have a procedural due process claim because “a challenge 
to a generalized legislative determination—for example, that all 
juveniles of a certain age who are charged with certain qualifying crimes 
must be tried in adult court—is made under the substantive component 
of the Due Process Clause.”166 This is an overbroad generalization. A 
statute can be challenged based on procedural due process, but only 
when the challenge is to the fairness of the process being followed, and 
 
 166. Id. at ¶ 42. 
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if the potential impact on an individual could result in the loss of a 
benefit.167  
Indeed, Kent was decided pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act, a statute 
of general applicability. Thus, if the concurrence were correct, the claim 
available to Kent would be one of substantive due process. This must 
mean that the outcome of Kent; that “there is no place in the U.S. system 
of law for waiving juvenile jurisdiction without ceremony--without 
hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of 
reasons,”168 must be a substantive standard. The Supreme Court of the 
United States disagrees. If a mandatory transfer challenge can be 
brought as a procedural due process claim, the juvenile must show that 
the challenge is not to apply for the benefit of the juvenile justice 
system, but to retain the statutorily created entitlement of the juvenile 
justice system. 
Fundamental fairness is not an independent analysis, but a requirement 
of due process, and must be applied in either a procedural or 
substantive due process review. 
Neither majority can come to an agreement on the application of the 
standard of fundamental fairness, nor its relation to procedural or 
substantive due process. The question remains: is fundamental fairness a 
procedural standard, substantive, or neither? Or is it a due process 
standard independent of the procedural/substantive analysis?  
The notion of fundamental fairness in due process cases is not a new 
one in Supreme Court of the United States jurisprudence, dating back to 
at least 1942.169 It was first introduced in the juvenile context in Justice 
Harlan’s 1967 concurring opinion in In re Gault.170 The Supreme Court 
of Ohio has adopted the view that “[a]pplying the Due Process Clause is 
therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover what 
‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a particular situation by first 
considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several 
 
 167. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, 604, 2015; see Am. Mfrs. 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 60 (1999) (“In both cases [Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v. 
Eldredge], an individual's entitlement to benefits had been established, and the question presented was 
whether predeprivation notice and a hearing were required before the individual's interest in continued 
payment of benefits could be terminated”). 
 168. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 542 (1966) 
 169. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455. (“Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an 
appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of 
fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the 
light of other considerations, fall short of such denial”). 
 170. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 72 (1967) (“No more restrictions should be imposed than are 
imperative to assure the proceedings' fundamental fairness”). 
19
Knowlden: State of Ohio v. Aalim: Due Process and Mandatory Transfer of Juv
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
270 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
interests that are at stake.”171 Thus, the court must determine what 
constitutes fundamental fairness by “being true to the core concept of 
due process in a juvenile case.”172  
Although it may seem like a strictly procedural standard, the concept 
has been applied in substantive due process since at least 1963, when the 
Supreme Court of the United States decided Gideon v. Wainwright. 
There, the Court ruled that fundamental fairness requires a substantive 
due process right for indigent defendants to be have counsel appointed 
to represent them.173 The fundamental fairness standard was commonly 
used by the Warren Court174 to review constitutional criminal procedure 
claims.175 However, the Court moved away from that standard and 
began to use the doctrine of selective incorporation.176 Fundamental 
fairness is not dead, however, as the Supreme Court of the United States 
sometimes uses the standard to address pre-trial and post-trial 
procedures.177  
The majority in Aalim I incorrectly and impermissibly used a strict 
fundamental fairness standard in reaching its decision. The concept is 
not a separate standard, but can sometimes be a requirement of due 
process which must be applied in either the procedural or substantive 
due process context, not as a standalone analysis.178 To separate the 
standard as an independent inquiry would create a third standard for due 
process analysis and only confuse courts and legal scholars more than 
they already are.  
So, Aalim properly brought two separate arguments pertinent to this 
analysis: (1) that fundamental fairness grounded in procedural due 
process requires that a juvenile demonstrate the capacity to change;179 
and (2) that juveniles have a substantive due process right to retain their 
 
 171. State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956 at ¶ 22. 
 172. Id. at ¶ 23. 
 173. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 174. Earl Warren was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1953-
1969. 
 175. Tracey L. Mears, Everything Old is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the Legitimacy 
of Criminal Justice, 3 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 105, 106 (2012).  
 176. Id. at 113. (Selective Incorporation is a theory that theory that holds that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates to the States certain guarantees of the Bill of Rights). 
 177. Id. at 115. 
 178. In re C.S., 2007-Ohio-4919, 115 Ohio St. 3d 267, 277, 874 N.E.2d 1177, 1187. (“Due 
process is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. 
Rather, the phrase expresses the requirement of ‘fundamental fairness,’ a requirement whose meaning 
can be as opaque as its importance is lofty.”) 
 179. While Aalim’s fundamental fairness argument was not explicitly brought under procedural 
due process, as discussed above, fundamental fairness is not an independent standard of due process 
review. Because Aalim made a separate substantive due process argument, the fundamental fairness 
argument should be applied to procedural due process. 
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status as a child.180  
Aalim’s challenge to mandatory transfer was properly brought as a 
violation of substantive due process; however, the right to an 
amenability hearing has not been recognized as a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the Constitution, and therefore the substantive claim was 
appropriately dismissed.  
No court has ever held that juveniles have a fundamental right, 
guaranteed by the Constitution, to be treated as juveniles in the criminal 
justice context. Fundamental rights include those which are “objectively, 
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . and ‘implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice 
would exist if they were sacrificed.’”181 When a fundamental right is 
inhibited by legislation, the legislation must be narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling governmental interest; a very high standard.  
The majority in Aalim II unpersuasively, yet correctly, dismissed the 
notion that juveniles have a fundamental right to an amenability hearing. 
The majority reasoned that because both Ohio’s Due Course of Law 
Clause (1851) and the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) predate the 
creation of the juvenile court system in 1899, and the addition of an 
amenability hearing to the juvenile court system in 1969, that there 
cannot be a substantive right to the specific juvenile court proceeding.182 
This hollow analysis, while commonly used, directly contradicts 
established Supreme Court of the United States precedent finding 
fundamental rights that similarly do not predate the Due Process Clause. 
Examples include the right to receive an abortion,183 the right to use 
contraceptives,184 the right of two consenting adults of the same sex to 
engage in sexual conduct,185 and the right to personal choice regarding 
marriage.186  
Substantive due process, rightly so, has been criticized as an avenue 
for ambitious judges to instill their own personal beliefs into the law. 
But, simply disagreeing with the notion of substantive due process does 
not allow the majority to intentionally misinterpret established precedent 
recognizing that “[n]either the Bill of Rights not the specific practices of 
States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks 
the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth 
 
 180. Merit Brief of Appellant Matthew Aalim, January 11, 2016, i, ii.  
 181. State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956 at ¶ 16. 
 182. Id. at ¶ 17. 
 183. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 184. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 185. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 186. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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Amendment protects.”187 
Moreover, the majority’s analysis also fails common sense. Its 
closed-minded, literalistic approach to substantive due process claims, 
which, if adopted, would mean that fundamental rights not recognized in 
1868 are unprotected by the Constitution. Surely this cannot be right. 
Consider the fact that it was not until 1963 that the Court recognized a 
fundamental due process right to the assistance of counsel in a state 
court proceeding.188 It seems the Aalim II majority would have no 
quarrel with the termination of the public defender’s office. In a more 
relevant hypothetical, imagine that, rather than instituting the mandatory 
transfer of certain juveniles to adult court, the Ohio General Assembly 
decided to enact legislature that abolished the entire juvenile justice 
system. Then could the majority comfortably reason that there is no 
substantive due process right to have a juvenile justice system? That a 
system established for more than a century and existing in every state is 
not “deeply rooted in our Nation’s history?” Common sense indicates 
otherwise. 
Regardless of the flaws inherent in its reasoning, the Aalim II 
majority’s ruling is ultimately correct, because neither the Supreme 
Court of the United States, nor any other court, which for good reasons 
are reluctant to “discover” new fundamental rights, has recognized a 
fundamental right for a juvenile to receive a specific criminal procedure. 
Certainly, Aalim was decided under the Due Course of Law Clause of 
the Ohio Constitution, which is a document of independent force. And, 
the U.S. Constitution provides the floor, not the ceiling, for individual 
States to abide by. Nevertheless, considering the inability of the Justices 
to agree on the standard of analysis, and the fact that the majority in 
Aalim I failed to even consider the issue in terms of substantive due 
process, at this time there is not a compelling reason for the Supreme 
Court of Ohio to recognize a right to an amenability hearing as a 
fundamental right.189 
 
 187. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1992). 
 188. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 189. For legislation not affecting a fundamental right, the government need only prove a rational 
basis for the statute.  Therefore, in order for mandatory transfer to pass substantive due process review, 
it must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest; a very low standard where the courts are 
extremely deferential to the legislature. Because state legislatures unquestionably have a legitimate 
interest in preventing and punishing crime, and because there is at least a rational basis for sending 
juveniles to adult court in relation to that interest, mandatory transfer statutes pass substantive due 
process muster. For this reason, the majority in Aalim I wisely did not perform a substantive due process 
analysis. 
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The ruling in Kent supports the notion that Aalim appropriately 
challenged mandatory transfer on the basis of procedural due process. 
The appropriate standard for due process in juvenile proceedings, as 
set out by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1967, and adopted 
by the Supreme Court of Ohio,190 is fundamental fairness,191 which 
should be applied in either a procedural or substantive due process 
analysis. The only time the Supreme Court of the United States has ever 
addressed mandatory transfer of juveniles to adult court was Kent in 
1966, decided on procedural due process grounds.192 There, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that procedural due process 
requires that a juvenile court cannot waive its jurisdiction over a child 
without “ceremony--without hearing, without effective assistance of 
counsel, without a statement of reasons,”193 because transfer is such a 
“critically important” action determining the rights of the individual. As 
the court noted: “[i]t would be extraordinary if society’s special concern 
for children, as reflected in the [Act], permitted this procedure.”194 Thus, 
the intent of the act is of special relevance when assessing the 
procedures in place. 
The appropriateness of Aalim’s fundamental fairness procedural due 
process claim is contingent on the court deciding that receiving an 
amenability hearing is not an application for a benefit, but a petition for 
the retention of a benefit. As discussed above, a procedural due process 
challenge can only exist when the petitioner is attempting to retain a 
statutorily-conferred benefit and is not applicable when the petitioner is 
applying to receive an additional benefit. The ruling in Kent, grounded 
in procedural due process, supports the theory that juveniles may 
challenge transfer to adult court on the basis that they are being deprived 
of the benefit of the juvenile justice system: “[t]he net, therefore, is that 
petitioner -- then a boy of 16 -- was by statute entitled to certain 
procedures and benefits as a consequence of his statutory right to the 
‘exclusive’ jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.”195 The court ordered that 
these procedures must include “a hearing, including access by his 
counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports which 
presumably are considered by the court, and to a statement of reasons 
for the Juvenile Court’s decision”.196 The court “believe[d] that this 
 
 190. In re C.S., 2007-Ohio-4919, 115 Ohio St. 3d 267, 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 80. 
 191. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 (1967). 
 192. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 542 (1966). 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. at 554. 
 195. Id. at 557. (Emphasis added). 
 196. Id. 
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result is required by the statute read in the context of constitutional 
principles relating to due process.”197 
The court in Aalim I acted within its authority when it ruled that 
mandatory transfer without an amenability hearing was a violation of 
due process. 
As discussed above, Aalim appropriately challenged mandatory 
transfer as a violation of procedural due process because Aalim was 
being deprived of the benefit of the juvenile justice system. The 
Supreme Court of Ohio acted within its purview when it declared that 
due process under the Ohio Constitution requires an amenability hearing 
before transfer to adult court. The outcome may be different if the court 
decided the case under the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution, as the Supreme Court of the United States has never made 
a similar decision on mandatory transfer. 
As the court stated, the Ohio Constitution is a document of 
independent force; the Ohio Due Course of Law Clause is given the 
same effect as the federal due process clause; and the federal 
constitution provides the floor, not the ceiling, for individual States to 
abide by. Further, the Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled that the Ohio 
Constitution requires greater protection than the U.S. Constitution.198 
The Supreme Court of Ohio has also recognized that “[s]ince its origin, 
the juvenile justice system has emphasized individual assessment, the 
best interest of the child, treatment, and rehabilitation, with a goal of 
reintegrating juveniles back into society.”199  
The Supreme Court of Ohio in Aalim I conducted an analysis very 
similar to that of the Supreme Court of the United States in Kent. The 
Supreme Court of the United States declared that, in light of the purpose 
of the Juvenile Court Act and, because juveniles are entitled to the 
benefit of the juvenile court, due process required additional procedural 
safeguards before transferring a child to adult court. The Supreme Court 
of Ohio similarly held that, because juveniles have a special status, and 
in conjunction with the purpose to “provide for the care, protection, and 
mental and physical development of children . . . and rehabilitate the 
 
 197. Id.  
 198. Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, 2016-Ohio-8118, 149 Ohio St. 3d 307, 75 
N.E.3d 122 at ¶ 61 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in judgment only). 
 199. State v. Hanning, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000); Previously, the Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled 
that automatic lifelong registration requirements for juvenile sex offenders is a violation of due process. 
See In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729 at ¶ 71. (The court reasoned that 
because the goals of the juvenile justice system are rehabilitation and reintegration, fundamental fairness 
requires that a juvenile judge exercises discretion when deciding what punishment is appropriate for the 
individual circumstances).  
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offender,”200 the additional procedural safeguard of an amenability 
hearing is required before depriving a juvenile of the benefit of the 
juvenile court system. The court ruled that because juveniles are 
constitutionally required to be treated differently from adults for 
sentencing purposes, that juvenile procedures must also account for that 
difference.  
The court had the authority to make this ruling, however the majority 
of Aalim I did not perform the appropriate procedural due process 
analysis, instead relying solely on the principle of fundamental fairness. 
A proper Mathews v. Eldridge analysis was not performed until the 
dissenting opinion of Aalim II. Mathews requires a consideration of the 
petitioner’s interest and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that 
interest if the current procedures are used, combined with the value of 
additional safeguards and weighed against any interest the government 
has in the matter. A strong argument can be made that these factors are 
satisfied; and apparently the majority in Aalim II did not dispute this, 
because they did not perform a Mathews procedural analysis. 
Juveniles have a substantial interest in retaining their juvenile status, 
as the State of Ohio has admitted that the real issue in mandatory 
transfer cases is punishing, not rehabilitating the offender. Further, 
mandatory transfer poses a high risk of an erroneous deprivation of a 
juvenile’s interest in retaining juvenile status and the benefit of the 
juvenile system. In the probable cause hearing, a juvenile judge is 
allowed no discretion, and is required to transfer the child to adult court 
if there is probable cause that the juvenile committed the crime alleged. 
Moreover, the value of additional safeguards is high. An amenability 
hearing would require slightly more resources than the already required 
probable cause hearing, yet it would result in greater protection of a 
juvenile’s interest in juvenile status, because an individualized 
determination would allow for a discretionary transfer to adult court if 
the juvenile judge believes that the juvenile is not able to be 
rehabilitated.  
Finally, although the government certainly has an interest in 
punishing juvenile criminal offenders, the government also has an 
interest in serving as its parens patriae role and rehabilitating the 
juvenile offender. A juvenile’s substantial interest in retaining the 
benefit of the juvenile justice system is not outweighed by the minimal 
additional expenditure that an amenability hearing would require. Nor is 
it outweighed by the governments interest in punishing juvenile crime, 
because that interest must be balanced by the governments interest in 
rehabilitating the juvenile offender. The Mathews test is likely satisfied.  
 
 200. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.01 (2017). 
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The majority in Aalim I did not abuse its judicial power in ruling that 
the Ohio Constitution requires an amenability hearing before a juvenile 
is transferred to adult court; however, the analysis used to reach that 
decision was flawed. Even so, the addition of an individualized 
amenability hearing likely satisfies the procedural due process test 
enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge. And, while the Supreme Court of 
the United States has never issued a similar ruling, the Supreme Court of 
Ohio is permitted to do so, because the Ohio Constitution is a document 
of independent force. The ruling of Aalim I should not have been 
disturbed. 
Because mandatory transfer to adult court is so similar to sentencing, 
the Supreme Court of the United States “kids are different” approach 
should be applied to juvenile proceedings. 
In 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the 
execution of a juvenile is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment, because juveniles 
are categorically different from adults.”201 Then, in 2010, the Court used 
this “kids are different” rationale to rule that sentences of life without 
parole for non-homicidal crimes constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment because juveniles are fundamentally different from 
adults.202 In 2011, the Court noted that “children are often less mature 
and responsible than adults;”203 they “often lack the experience, 
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be 
detrimental to them.”204 “[T]hey are more vulnerable or susceptible to 
outside pressures than adults”205 and “children characteristically lack the 
capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete 
ability to understand the world around them.”206 In 2012, the Court 
explicitly affirmed that “children are constitutionally different from 
adults for purposes of sentencing,” due to “their diminished culpability 
and greater prospects for reform.”207 
The next logical step is to extend this “kids are different” analysis to 
 
 201. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005). (The Court noted that children possess "a lack 
of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility” which results in "impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions;" "juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative pressures, 
including peer pressure;" and "the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.").   
 202. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68-69 (2010). (The Court noted that juveniles’ brains are 
still maturing through adolescence, and they are more capable of change than adults). 
 203. J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012). 
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address pre-sentencing procedures; namely, mandatory transfer. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly recognized that there 
are constitutional differences between children and adults for the 
purposes of sentencing, however, the Court has not explicitly held that 
this constitutional difference is limited to sentencing. Indeed, it defies 
logic to insist that juveniles are constitutionally different for this one 
limited purpose. 
Mandatory transfer to adult court is essentially the same as a 
sentence: “a transfer to adult court almost always is intended to allow 
for a harsher sentence than a juvenile court could impose.”208 This is but 
a truism. If it were not, mandatory transfer would not exist. Regardless, 
we do not have to speculate as to the function of mandatory transfer, 
because the State of Ohio settled the matter at oral arguments: “the crux 
of the issue is punishment.”209 Each transferred juvenile is deprived of 
the rehabilitative functions of the juvenile justice system and subjected 
to the harsh realities of adult court. Surely this is what the General 
Assembly intended when it enacted the statute; however, that does not 
mean that the statute should pass constitutional muster. Rather, because 
mandatory transfer implicates punishment and is principally similar to 
sentencing, the “kids are different” approach should be applied to 
juvenile proceedings. In recognition that juveniles are fundamentally 
different than adults, juveniles should have a right to ensure that an 
individualized determination of the juvenile’s ability to meet the goals 
of the juvenile justice system is made before transfer to adult court. 
Due to the controversial history of substantive due process, this 
article will not argue for the Supreme Court of the United States to 
recognize a substantive constitutional right for a juvenile to be entitled 
to receive the protections of the juvenile justice system. But, in light of 
the firmly grounded principle that “kids are different,” the Supreme 
Court of the United States needs to address the issue of mandatory 
transfer to adult court and make a ruling on whether juveniles are 
constitutionally different for pre-sentencing purposes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The effect of Aalim I, though now overruled, will send shockwaves 
throughout the juvenile justice system. Never before has a high court 
recognized that automatic transfer of juveniles to adult court is a 
violation of due process. It has been over fifty years since the Supreme 
Court of the United States has addressed mandatory transfer. The Court 
 
 208. State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956 at ¶ 68 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting). 
 209. Id. at ¶ 74 
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needs to address what constitutes fundamental fairness in transfer 
proceedings, and rule as to whether “kids are different” applies to 
criminal proceedings as well as sentencing. The impact of Aalim is yet 
to be determined, but it is likely that it has signaled the beginning of the 
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